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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-PERMISSIBLE EXTENT OF LIMITATION-At the present time this nation is greatly concerned over the state of its political health. Advocates of foreign ideologies are asserting their creeds with ever-increasing vigor. The doctrines
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they propound are generally conceded to be inconsistent with American
ideals, and their activity has induced a feeling of alarm, sometimes
attended by hostile reaction. There have been instances where this
reaction has taken the form of demands that the proponents of these
ideas be silenced. In these circumstances, it becomes important to
examine the power of state and federal governments to restrict their
activities, particularly with respect to the freedom of speech guaranteed
by the Constitution.
The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech ...." The Supreme Court has decided that the word'"liberty" as used in the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment includes freedom of speech.1 This fundamental right is thus protected against abridging action by both federal
and state governments, including the political subdivisions of the latter.
It is clear, however, that in neither case is this freedom absolute. What,
then, may a speaker say? How far may he go? To what extent may
he be punished for disturbing the public tranquility, and at what point
will it be constitutional to impose restraints upon him?
The first important statute in this century which was aimed directly at freedom of speech, and which regulated what a person might
say (or write) was the Espionage Act of 1917, together with its 1918
amendment. The 1917 act made it criminal to "make or convey false
reports or false statements" which would interfere with the operation
of the military or aid the enemy. 2 The same language was contained
in the 1918 amendment with additional restrictions, and it was made
criminal for any person to "utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal,
profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of the government of the United States" or its Constitution, Hag, military forces,
and uniforms. 3 The statute laid down broad prohibitions and six of
the many prosecutions for violations of it came before the Supreme
Court.4 With one exception, all of these six cases contained counts
of conspiracy to violate the act and were concerned with matter printed,
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925).
40 Stat. L. 219 (1917).
3 40 Stat. L. 553 (1918). Repealed, 41 Stat. L. 1360 (1921).
4 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919); Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204, 39 S.Ct. 249 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 39 S.Ct.
252 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 40 S.Ct. 17 (1919); Schaefer v. United
States, 251 U.S. 466, 40 S.Ct. 259 (1920); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 40 S.Ct.
205 (1920).
.
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published or distributed by the defendants. The one exception was
the case of Debs 11. United States,5 involving a public speech made
by Eugene Debs in Ohio. The charge was that Debs, in delivering
the speech, had intended to obstruct recruiting and enlistment as well
as to cause mutiny and refusal of duty in the military forces. Debs
admitted his intention and attempts to obstruct the war, and, as in
the five other cases mentioned, his conviction was affirmed.
In the first of these cases, Schenck v. United States, 6 Justice Holmes
announced his classic test for determining what limitations may constitutionally be put upon the freedoms of speech and press.
"The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree." 7
For some reason, Holmes did not employ this standard in either
the Frohwerk or Debs cases, which immediately followed the Schenck
case, and his failure to do so has been criticized. 8 Whatever the
reason may have been, the three subsequent espionage cases made
it evident that he had not abandoned the test. In these three
cases, both Holmes and Brandeis voted against conviction as in each
case they did not think that the test had been satisfied. 9 In spite of
the liberality shown by the latter twQ justices,1° these decisions all
affirmed the constitutionality of the Espionage Act and demonstrated
249 U.S. 211, 39 S.Ct. 252 (1919).
249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919).
7Jd. at 52.
s Freund, ''The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech," 19 N:nw REPUBLIC 13 (1919);
see also CHAPBE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 84 (1941). LERNER, THEM=
AND FAITH OF JusncB HoLMES 298 (1943) suggests that criticism "should be tempered by
an understanding of the problems of judicial strategy."
o Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 624, 40 S.Ct. 20 (1919); Schaefer v. United
States, 251 U.S. 482, 40 S.Ct. 264 (1920); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 253, 40 S.Ct.
211 (1920).
10 "But when men have realized that time has upset many £ghting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is •••
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. • • • I think that we should be eternally
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be
fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the
lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the
country." Holmes, dissenting in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 624 at 630, 40 S.Ct. 20
(1919).
5

6
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that, at least in time of war, the government may make large inroads
upon the freedom to disseminate ideas and opinions.11
. In the area of state legislation directly aimed at limiting the freedom of speech, the criminal syndicalism statutes are of major importance. These statutes make it a crime to advocate or teach any
· unlawful methods or terrorism as a means of effecting either political
or industrial changes, and also prohibit organizing or joining any group
advocating criminal syndicalism as de6.ned in the statutes.12 The first
case under such a statute arose in 1925, and while the defendant was
convicted for publishing a manifesto, the Court announced that the
freedoms of the First Amendment were included within the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 13 The manifesto contained
utterances advocating violent overthrow of the government and while
the Court conceived that there might be· no present danger that it
would stir persons to at:complish this, yet the publication "threatened
breaches of the peace and ultimate revolution."14 The Court was
willing to accept the state legislature's determination that such utterances were inimical to the public welfare.
Two years after this decision, the S~preme Court reviewed three
criminal syndicalism cases on the same day. In two of these,1 5 it
affirmed the constitutionality of the California syndicalism act and
convictions under it. In discussing the constitutionality of the act, the
Court again showed that it would give great weight to the state legislature's determination that such legislation was necessary to combat
an existing evil. In one case, Justice Brandeis wrote a separate opinion
containing a masterly exposition of the policy behind, and the operation of, the clear and present danger rule. 16 Holmes concurred in
Brandeis' opinion and both concurred with the majority as defendant
had failed to show circumstances tending to prove there had been no
danger of the substantive evil claimed by the state as justification for
the statute. In the third case, the Supreme Court held that the Kansas
11 The constitutionality of a state statute similar to the Espionage Act was affirmed in
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 41 S.Ct. 125 (1920).
12 For sample statutes and a study of the forces and factors involved in enacting and
repealing these laws, see DoWELL, A HISTORY OP Cru:MINAL SYNDICALISM LEGISLATION IN
THE UNITED STATES (1939).
13 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925).
14 Id. at 669.
15 Burns v. United States, 274 U.S. 328, 47 S.Ct. 650 (1927); Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 47 S.Ct. 641 (1927).
16 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 372, 47 S.Ct. 647 (1927).
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criminal syndicalism statute, as applied to the defendant, was unconstitutional. I7 In this case, it was not shown that the organization
for which defendant solicite_d memberships advocated any crime, violence, or other unlawful action of the types named in the statute.
Some years later, the Court likewise held that the Oregon criminal
syndicalism law, as applied, was an unconstitutional deprivation of
the rights of free speech and assembly.Is In that case, the Court
reversed the conviction of a defendant who had assisted in conducting
a meeting held under the auspices of the Communist Party, on the
ground that no teaching or advocacy of unlawful acts at the meeting
was shown.
These decisions clearly indicate that it is within the power of a
state to punish advocacy of, and incitement to, violent action for the
overthrow of existing institutions by revolutionary or other unlawful
methods. It must, however, appear that there is an existing danger
to the state in order for such legislation to be justified. In the earlier
cases, the state legislature's determination of that fact appears to have
been controlling, but the more recent cases indicate that the Court
is now likely to make its own examination of the circumstances and
strike down the legislation if it cannot find a clear and present danger.
Thus the application of a Georgia insurrection statute to a Communist
organizer was held unconstitutional, because the statute was too indefinite and because the violence advocated by the organizer was too
distant to be a present threat.Io Likewise, the Court found that
encouraging people not to salute the flag, while it might create disrespect for the government, could not constitutionally be made a crime
since it constituted no danger to existing institutions. 20
Just as the Supreme Court has decided that limits may be put upon
freedom of speech for the protection of the government, public institutions, and the law, so it has decided that limits may be put upon that
11 Fiske v.

Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 47 S.Ct. 655 (1927).

18 DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S.Ct. 255 (1937).
19 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 57 S.Ct. 732 (1937).

"Appellant's intent to incite
insurrection, if it is to be found, must rest upon his procuring members for the Communist
Party and his possession of that party's literature when he was arrested." Id. at 253. This
did not constitute a clear and present danger.
20 Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583, 63 S.Ct. 1200 (1943). Cf. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532 (1931). In effect, speech was compelled by holding
constitutional a compulsory salute and pledge of allegiance in Minersville School District v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 60 S.Ct. 1010 (1940), overruled by West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178 (1943).
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freedom for the protection of the individual. The latter type of limitation is illustrated by the case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. 21 In
that decision, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
statute which prohibited a speaker from calling any person an offensive
name in a public place. As construed and applied, the operation of
the statute was limited to those cases wherein such name calling
might directly tend to cause a breach of the peace. The appellations
"d amned racketeer" an d "damned F asc1st
· " , d·1rected at the city
· marshall, were found by the Court to be "those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."22
The Supreme Court thus held that what it characterized as ":6.ghting"23
words could constitutionally be prohibited. The difficulty with the
decision, of course, comes in determining what words are "fighting"
words. Terms that might incense one person may leave others unrufHed, and what might be a "fighting" word today may well lose its
provocative effect tomorrow. Fortunately, the effect of the Chaplinsky
decision may have been somewhat abated by a later decision in which
the Supreme Court described the words "unfair" and "Fascist" as loose
language and said they were "part of the conventional give-and-take
in our economic and political controversies."24
Up to this point, consideration has been confined to statutes that
have directly regulated what a speaker might say, what words he might
use, or what he might advocate: statutes aimed at controlling the
content of his speech.25 Consideration must be given as well to the
many statutes which, while having the accomplishment of some other
purpose as their main object, nevertheless have an important effect
on limiting the freedom of speech. Of this sort are the statutes designed
to preserve and promote the peace, good order and convenience of the
community. The fundamental freedom questions raised in the application of some classes of these statutes have been fairly well settled.
The constitutionality of statutes requiring licenses or permits to be
315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942).
at 572. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900 (1940).
2a Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 at 572, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942).
24 Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 at 295, 64 S.Ct. 126 (1943).
25 See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625 (1923) and Bartels v. Iowa,
262 U.S. 404, 43 S.Ct. 628 (1923) which held unconstitutional statutes prohibiting the
teaching of any modern language except English in the schools. Note that these cases were
decided before the Supreme Court announced the inclusion of First Amendment freedoms
within the Fourteenth. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925).
21

22 Id.

1950]

COMMENTS

343

obtained in order to hold meetings in public places,26 to have parades,27
to make house-to-house solicitations,28 or to distribute literature29 have
all been passed upon by the Court. The same is true of statutes regulating picketing and the use of placards to publicize the facts of labor
disputes. 30 With respect to those statutes which are designed to prevent breaches of the peace, however, the law is still unsettled. Just
how much these statutes may limit a public speaker's freedom of speech
is a question which so far appears to have defied solution.
The case of Terminiello v. City of Chicago31 raised the question,
but the Court, unfortunately, avoided answering it directly. In that
case, T erminiello delivered a speech before some eight hundred people
in an auditorium while a crowd of over a thousand people outside the
auditorium vigorously protested the meeting by both voice and action.
In his speech, Terminiello used such expressions as "slimy scum" and
"skunks of Jews" and denounced the Roosevelt family, the New Deal>
Communism, Morgenthau, and Zionist Jews. The evidence was conHicting as to the extent of his audience's reaction to the speech, but
there was no actual clash between his listeners and the crowd outside.
He was convicted under a Chicago ordinance32 for creating a breach
of the peace. 33 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed,
saying:
" ... freedom of speech, though not absolute ... is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown
likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious or substantive evil that rises far above the public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. ...
The ordinance as construed by the trial court seriously invaded this province. It permitted conv.iction of petitioner if his
2s Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954 (1939).
27 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61
28 Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 62 S.Ct.

S.Ct. 762 (1941).
1231 (1942), reversed, 319 U.S. 103, 63
S.Ct. 890 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870 (1943); Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862 (1943).
29 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146 (1939); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438 (1944).
30 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310
U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 746 (1940).
31 (U.S. 1949) 69 S.Ct. 894.
32 "All persons who shall make, aid, countenance, or assist in making any improper noise,
riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion tending to a breach of the peace, within
the limits of the city ••• shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct, and upon conviction
thereof, shall be severally fined .•••" Chicago Rev. Code (1939) §1 (1), c. 193.
33 Chicago v. Terminiello, 400 ID. 23, 79 N.E. (2d) 39 (1948).
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speech stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought
about a condition of unrest. A conviction resting on any of those
grounds may not stand."34
By thus disposing of the case, the Court did not reach the issue
of whether the epithets mentioned were "fighting" words, which they
had said in the Chaplinsky case were outside the scope of constitutional
protection. Nor dicl the Court indicate the extent to which a speaker
might disrupt the public tranquility and still be protected. The opinion
of the majority seems to indicate, however, that in cases of this sort,
the test to be applied is that of clear and present danger. 35 It must
be remembered that the clear and present danger test would make a
"breach of the peace" limitation on speech unconstitutional unless the
limitation served to ward off a substantive evil that was not only
imminent but of a very serious nature.36 It has been pointed out:3 7
that in the Illinois courts, T erminiello was found to have breached the
peace in five different ways. Whether any one or all of these would
have amounted to a sufficiently serious substantive evil to have warranted the limitation one cannot determine from the majority opinion
of the Supreme Court. Justice Jackson, in his dissenting opinion, made
it clear that he had no doubt that Terminiello's conduct in the existing situation satisfied all the elements of the clear and present danger
test.3s
Assuming that the Court has indicated an intention to apply
Holmes' rule in cases of this sort, the quesion arises: is it the best way
34 Terminiello v. Chicago, (U.S. 1949) 69 S.Ct. 894 at 896. Four justices dissented
as they thought the Court had seized upon an improper ground for reversal: one that was not
objected to below, nor argued before the Supreme Court. Two of these indicated as well that
they were in favor of affirming the conviction.
35Note, however, that Douglas' statement of the test, "unless shown likely to produce
a clear and present danger," [id. at 896] differs from Holmes' statement, "create a clear and
present danger," at note 7, above.
36 "What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished. Those cases do not purport to mark the
furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression, nor do we here. They do no
more than recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights. For the First Amendment
does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law 'abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.' It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit.language, read in
the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow.'' Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 at
263, 62 S.Ct. 190 (1941).
37 16 Umv. Cm. L. R:sv. 328 (1949).
38 (U.S. 1949) 69 S.Ct. 899. Contrast the opinion of Niemeyer, P.J., dissenting when
the case was in the Illinois Appellate Court, 332 ill. App. 41 (1947).
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of determining at what point a speaker may constitutionally be limited?
It has been suggested that the test should be abandoned, 39 and that
the freedom of the speaker should be made to depend upon whether
the content of his speech is concerned with matters affecting the public
interest40 or those affecting matters of private interest only. It is urged
that protection of speech involving the former should admit of no
exceptions, while protection of speech involving the latter may be
subject to such restrictions as the general welfare of the community
may require. The classification may have a reasonable basis, but it
does not seem to help in determining where to draw the line on statutory restraints. If one surmounts the difficulty of resolving what speech
is of public interest, he meets the difficulty of determining how to deal
with speech that contains matter of mixed public and private interest.
Again, so far as speech of purely private interest is concerned, how
is one to measure what the welfare of the community may require?
Classification and application of a double standard do not seem to bring
the solution of the problem any closer.
The use of the clear and present danger test involves many difficulties too. As well as satisfying all the elements of the test, there
is still the problem of determining just how much responsibility should
be pinned on the speaker for the actions of the crowd he addresses.
If he is guilty of a breach of the peace because the words he uses
provoke someone to action against him or his party, then it appears
that the speaker can be effectively throttled. On the other hand, if
the speaker, even without directly urging action, incites the crowd
to massacre members of a minority group or to the riotous destruction
of property, then it would seem he should be prohibited from claiming protection under the Constitution. Clearly, some responsibility
must be put upon the crowd. Freedom of speech should not be abridged
merely to shelter the public from exposure to ideas they may detest
and which may provoke them to some action. Nor should it be restricted merely to suit the convenience of law enforcement officials.
The problem is one of balancing the fundamental freedom of unimpaired speech against the danger to society that is sometimes likely
39 MmlrnLJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND !Ts RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT (1948);
Rosenwein, ''The Supreme Court and Freedom of Speech-Terminiello v. City of Chicago,"
9 LAWYERS GUILD REv. 70 (1949).
40 Speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues with which voters have to deal:
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND !Ts RELATION To SELF GoVERNMENT 94 (1948).
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to result from unbridled oratory. In using the clear and present danger
test, the Court must take all the circumstances into consideration.
These include the content of the speech, the attitude and reactions
of the crowd, the vehemence of the speaker, the nature of the action
urged, if any, and what action resulted from giving the speech. In
order to find any limitation upon the speaker justified, the Court, in
applying the test as it was laid down by Holmes and developed by
Brandeis, would have to apprehend an imminent danger and would
have to find that the danger was a serious one. "The fact that speech
is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is
not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability
of serious injury· to the state."41
There are some members of the Court who dislike the clear and
present danger· rule. 42 It seems to this writer, however, that the continued existence of freedom of speech depends upon an ordered society,
which in tum demands that the freedoms given in the Constitution
be not absolute. This being the case there must be some guide to assist
both the state and the individual in determining what they may constitutionally do in this field. The clear and present danger test is no
magic formula which automatically gives a correct solution in each
case to which it is applied, nor should it be. It is only a helpful guide
in determining where to strike the balance of social interests. With
enlightened application43 it should assist the judiciary in allowing
the preservation of order by national and state governments without
unduly infringing upon the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
Constitution.
·
Clinton R. Ashford, S. Ed.
41 Whitney

v. California, 274 U.S. 357 at 378, 47 S.Ct. 641 (1927).
discussion of the development of the rule in Green, "The Supreme Court, The
Bill of Rights, and The States," 97 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 608 (1949). The author states, at p.
636: "While clear and present danger has now become a formidable weapon for the defense
of the First Amendment freedoms, it seems likely to remain formidable only so long as it is
wielded by a willing arm." Two of the proponents of the rule have recently died. The
opponents of the rule are still on the bench. The new members of the court may determine
whether there shall be a "willing arm."
43 "This is a rule of reason. Correctly applied, it will preserve the right of free speech
both from suppression by tyrannous, well-meaning majorities and from abuse by irresponsible,
fanatical minorities. Like many other rules for human conduct, it can be applied correctly
only by the exercise of good judgment; and to the exercise of good judgment, calmness is, in
times of deep feeling and on subjects which excite passion, as essential as fearlessness and
honesty." Brandeis, dissenting in Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 at 482-3, 40 S.Ct.
259 (1920).
42 See

